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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WESTERN STATES REFINING 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
BLAIR BERRY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F:ACTS 
8602 
On June 7, 1956, plaintiff commenced this action in 
the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County by 
serving a ten day summons on defendant. The complaint 
was filed in time and, thereafter, the defendant, appear-
ing specially, filed a motion to quash service of summons 
on the ground that service was obtained by inveigling or 
enticing the defendant into the state of Utah by deceit, 
artifice or trick, and on the further ground that, unde:r 
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the facts of this case, defendant was immune from service 
of summons at the time summon.s was served upon him. 
The trial court denied the motion to quash, defendant 
petitioned this court for perrnission to appeal from s.aid 
interlocutory order and said permission was granted. 
Defendant is a resident of the state of Idaho, has 
been such for more than thirty years and has never been 
a resident of the state ofUtah (R. 11). When this action 
was commenced he was the owner of one service station 
at Rexburg, Idaho, and leased a second .service station 
at Rexburg from the plaintiff. The lease was embodied 
in a written agreement dated August 25, 1955, which .also 
contained provisions which the plaintiff contends require 
the defendant to sell only the petroleum products of the 
plaintiff. On December 28, 1955, provisions were added 
relating to credit card charges. Beginning ~hartly after 
the first of 1956, and continuing to date, the parties here-
to have disagreed over the interpretation of the terms of 
the said vvritten agreements, and over \Vhether plaintiff 
has been violating their terms. Plaintiff contends that 
said agreements require defendant to sell pl_aintiff 's 
petroleum product.s exclusively and defendant contends 
that they do not. In .addition,· there has been a contra-· 
versy in relation to the quality of the petroleun1 products 
being delivered to defendant by plaintiff under the agree-
nlents. These controversies are the subject of the suit 
connnenced by plaintiff by the disputed service of srun-
mons. 
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The President of the plaintiff corporation i.s W, S. 
Wagstaff, who is also a member of the bar of this court. 
Plaintiff's General Sales Manager is Neal R. Olson and 
plaintiff's attorney at the time this action was commenced 
. was. Richard .G. Boren, who was also. a employee of .the 
Sales Department under Mr. Olson. 
Sometime around the 1st of June, 1956, !{r. Olson 
·instructed Mr. Boren to make a trip to Idaho in the com-
pany of a Mr. Bruner, an Idaho managerial emplQyee 
of the plaintiff, and among other things to contact. the 
·defendant at Rexburg, Idaho, to. see if he could work. out 
the differences and resolve the controversies existing be-
t\veen plaintiff and defendant. He instructed. Mr. Boren 
that if he couldn't work out the differences, he should 
ask. the defendant to come to plaintiff's plant .at Woods 
Cross, Utah, for a conference so that everyone could sit 
down together and try to work out said differences (R. 
47.). Mr. Boren \vent to Idaho and, sometime during June 
4, 5, or 6, stopped at the station of defendant and, in the 
company of Mr. Bruner, conferred with defendant in 
relation to the .aforesaid items of controversy. There is 
a conflict between the testimony of defendant and ~fr. 
Boren as to exactly what was said but, according to.l\Ir. 
Boren, he told defendant that the plaintiff company was 
dissatisfied with defendant's leasing .a station of plaintiff, 
building a station of his own and transferring the (3U.sto-
mers from plaintiff's station to defendant's, with de-
fendant's selling products from other sources in contra-
vention of their written agreement and with certain credit 
card changes (R. 63 and 64). No agreement could be 
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reached in relation to the items in controver.sy and Mr. 
Boren requested that defendant come to Salt Lake City 
and discuss these matters with the officers of the plain-
tiff company and attempt to settle the controversy. De-
fendant stated that he would do so as soon a.s it could be 
arranged. 
In compliance with Mr. Boren's request, defendant, 
on June 7, 1956, drove directly from Rexburg, Idaho, to 
the offices of the plaintiff corporation at Woods Cross, 
Utah. The sole purpose of defendant's trip into Utah wa.s 
the conference with the officers of the plaintiff company 
(R. 25), and, as soon as it was terminated he drove di-
rectly back to Rexburg (R. 17 and 18). 
At the conference defendant discussed the items of 
controversy with ~Ir. Boren, Mr. Wagstaff, and Mr. 
Olson. While the conference was going on in Mr. Olson's 
office, Mr. Wagstaff, in his own office and out of the 
defendant's presence!, instructed ~fr. Boren to prepare a 
summons and have the same ready to serve on defendant 
if no agreement could be reached (R. 43). Pursuant to 
that instruction, Mr. Boren had a peace officer called to 
the plant and prep~ared the summons \Vhich was eventu-
ally served on the defendant. ~fr. Royal A. Reynolds, 
North S.alt Lake Township 1\farshal, can1e to plaintiff's 
office in response to said request, and waited for some 
tilne in the plaintiff's \Vaiting roon1. "\\7hen ~Ir. Boren 
felt that no agree1nent was being reached, he called Mr. 
Reynolds and had hin1 con1e into the conference room and 
serve the sunnnons upon the defendant. According to 
Mr. Boren, the defendant 'vas surprised by the appear-
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5 
ance of the Marshal and the serv1ce of the summons 
(R. 61). 
At the hearing on the motion to quash there was evi-
dence prese·nted in the form of the testimony of the 
plaintiff's officers indicating that the possibility of suing 
defendant had been given some consideration prior to 
the time he was invited to come to Utah. Mr. Boren, at-
torney for defendant at the time summons was served, 
indicated that he had given some thought to the question 
of whether defendant, being an Idaho resident, could be 
sued in Utah, and had been under the impression that, 
since it was an action on a contract, suit could be com-
menced in either jurisdiction. There is testimony that 
the possibility of suing defendant had been considered by 
~Ir. Wagstaff, President of the plaintiff corporation, and 
by Mr. Olson, the Sales Manager prior to the invitation 
to the defendant. In these regards, however, it must be 
borne in mind that the ruling of the trial court denyin~ 
the motion to quash would imply a finding that there was 
no enticement or inveiglement by means of deceit, arti-
fice or trick. For this reason it must be assumed that 
the determinations of fact were against the position of 
this defendant. 
STATE1\1ENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS HERE-
IN BE·CAUSE AT THE TIME THE SUMMONS WAS SERVED 
ON DEFENDANT HE WAS IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF 
SUMMONS IN THIS ACTION. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANT'S MOTION 'T·O QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS HERE-
IN BE·CAUSE AT THE TIME THE SUMMONS WAS SERVED 
ON DEFENDANT HE WAS IMMUNE FROM SERVICE OF 
SUMMONS IN THIS ACTION. 
Defendant contends that he was immune from serv-
ice of summons at the time summons was served on him 
in this action for the reason that a nonresident who 
come~s into the jurisdiction at the invitation or request 
of a resident for the sole purpose of conferring with the 
resident in regard to the se,ttlement of a then existing 
controversy between them is inunune from service of 
summons in a suit involving the controversy which was 
the .subject of the conference, during his attendance at the 
conference .and for a sufficient period thereafter to en-
able him to return to his home. This is the rule estab-
lished by State ex rel Ellan v. District Court of Eighth 
Judicial District in and for Cascade County et al., 97 
Mont. 229, 33 P. (2d) 526, 93 A.L.R. 865, decided in 1934, 
a case which is exactly in point with the instant case. 
In the El.lan case, supra, Nicholas Ellan (who, like 
the defendant here, 'va.s a resident of the state of Idaho) 
was involved in a controversy 'vith a construction firm 
called House and Comerford, and with one Sam Orino, 
in relation to the rental of certain trucks and equipment 
belonging to Ellan "'"hich 'vere used by House and Comer-
ford as subcontractors under a prin1e contract let by the 
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state of Montana to said Sam Orino for the cons:truction 
of certain highways in Montana. Ellan claimed rental 
for the machines and House and Comerford denied lia-
bility and counterclaimed. At House's request Ellan 
accompanied House from Idaho to Montana, and the de-
clared objeet of the trip was a conference with Orino and 
the officers of the Montana Highway Commission in an 
effort to se~ttle the controversy. House and Ellan arrived 
at Helena, Montana on December 7, and on December 8 
Ellan was served with summons and a copy of the com-
plaint in an action by House and Comerford concerning 
- .. 
the controversy which was the subject of the proposed 
conference. Ellan appeared specially in the action and 
. - -
moved that service be quashed on the ground that he was 
enticed into the state of Montana for the purpose of 
service by a promise of compromise and settlement of the 
controversy between him and the plaintiffs. In his affi-
davit on s.aid motion to quash Ellan stated that House 
made false and fraudulent representations to him under 
preitense of discussing a compromise for the purpose of 
enticing him into the State in order to secure service on 
him, and House, in his counter-affidavit, sta;ted that he 
was acting in good faith and in the belief that a compro-
mise could be effected. The trial court found in favor of 
House and Comerford and against Ellan and denied the 
motion to quash. Ellan sought and secured a writ of pro-
hibition from the Supreme Court of Montana. The opin-
ion was written in the action for the- writ of prohibition. 
Much of the case involves the que.stion of whether 
prohibition will lie under such circumstances and the 
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~fontana court detennined that it would. The court then 
1noved to a consideration of the question of whether the 
service of summons on Ellan could be sustained and con-
cluded that, even giving full credit to the finding of the 
trial court that there was no fraud or misrepresentation, 
the summons must be quashed. The court pointed out 
that it taxed their credulity to the utmost to give credit 
to the finding of good faith and honest purpose on 
House's part in bringing Ellan into the state of Montana 
but .stated further that, since the trial court had deter-
ruined the conflict in the evidence on the subject of good 
faith in favor of House, they would accept that finding 
and give it full cognizance. The balance of the opinion 
is as follows: 
"The general rule is that when a non-resident 
party to an action, or a witness, comes into the 
state for the sole purpose of attending a trial, he 
is immune from the service of process during his 
attendance and for a reasonable period thereafter 
to enable him to return to his home. Stewart v. 
Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192; 
Page Co. v. ~facdonald, 261 U.S. 446, 43 S. Ct. 416, 
67 L. Ed. 737; State ex rei. Coe v. District Court, 
supra. According to the weight of authority, this 
rule applies to all proceedings which are in their 
nature judicial, 'vhether taking place in court or 
not (50 C.J. 554, and cases cited), and to attend-
ance upon the taking of depositions to be used in 
the trial of a c.au.se (50 C.J. 555, and cases cited). 
The rule has been extended to include a party at-
tending the examination of witnesses to be used 
on a trial of his case (Plilnpton v. ,v ... inslow [C.C.] 
9 F. 365), and to such .a one 'vho comes into a for-
eign jurisdiction, at the request of his counsel, 
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to be present during the argument on a demurrer 
(Kinne v. Lant [C.C.] 68 F. 436). 
"The question before us is usually treated un-
der the head of fraud and deceit in enticing a non-
resident into the jurisdiction in order to secure 
service upon him, and it is said that the service 
should be set aside when the defendant is pro-
cured to come into the jurisdiction by pretense of 
settlement. 50 C.J. 488; Olean St. Ry. Co. v. Fair-
mount Construction Co., 55 App. Div. 292, 67 
N.Y.S. 165; Higgins v. Dewey (City Ct.) 13 N.Y.S. 
570; Cav.anagh v. Manhattan Transit Co. (C.C.) 
133 F. 818, 819; Alderson on Judicial Writs and 
Process, § 126. 
"We can conceive of no valid reason for the 
differentiation. The law favors the compromise 
and settlement of disputed claims (12 c·.J. 336), 
and should protect a nonresident who comes into 
this state at the solicitation of his adversary for 
the purpose of attempting such ;a disposition of a 
controversy, to the same extent as when one comes 
here as a party to, or a witness in, a case in court. 
As was said in Allen v. Wharton, 59 Hun. 622, 13 
N.Y.S. 38, 39, respecting a situation similar to that 
in the case at bar: 'Good f:aith on the part of the 
plaintiff required that he should have permitted 
the defendant again to leave this city without 
making service of the summons when it became 
evident that no settlement would be effected 
through his agency. That was violated in making 
the service which was made upon him. It wa.s a 
breach of the confidence which had been inspired 
• • * and the settled practice requires that the 
service of the summons made, as this was made, 
should not be permitt'ed to stand.' While there, as 
here the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff 
' on conflicting testimony, the appellate court in 
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applying the 'enticement' rule s·aid that at the 
time the plaintiff invited the defendant to come 
to the state for fhe purpose of discussing a com-
promise or settlement, there probably lurked in 
his mind the idea of suit and service if settlement 
was not effected. This declaration detracts from 
the rule announced, and we think it unneees.sary 
to find the lower court's finding of good faith is 
not justified by the evidence, but that the general 
rule of immunity should apply. 
"Fe·deral Judge Van Fleet, of California, in 
discu.ssing the general rule, has said: 'Originally 
it was asserted solely as the privilege of the court 
for the protection of its own jurisdiction, but later 
as that of the person concerned as well. Bacon's 
Abr. tit. 'Privilege.' What the precise limits of 
the right were in its earlier history, or those to 
whom extended, it is not very material to here 
inquire. * * * While it is quite true that the right 
has most frequently arisen and been applied in 
connection with parties and witnesses in judicial 
proceedings, its extension in th'e process of time 
to those engaged in other departments of the pub-
lic service has been more largely by analogous 
application by the courts than as a result of legis-
lation.' Filer v. ~fcCornick (D.C.) 260 F. 309, 31±. 
"Quoting from Stewart v. Ran1say, supra, it 
is said: " 'Now, this great object in the adminis-
tration of justice " ... ould in a variety of \Yays be 
obstructed if parties and " ... itnesses were liable 
to be served with process "~}rile actually attending 
the court. It is often 1natter of great importance 
to the citizen to prevent the institution and prose-
cU!tion of a suit in any court at a distance from 
his ho1ne and his rnean,s. of defense ; .and the fear 
that a suit rnay be corn1nenced the·re by smnmon'3 
will as effectually prevent his approach as if capi-
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as might be served upon him. This is especially 
the case with citizens of neighboring states, to 
whom the power which the court possesses of com-
pelling attendance cannot reach.' It is these con-
siderations which have actuated the courts in ex-
tending the protection of the rule, so limited in 
the beginning, until it has come to embrace practi-
cally every one who may be called to a strange 
jurisdiction in connection with a cause, and every 
proceeding or step in the action, either heard be-
fore the court or any of its officers." 
"A bona fide attempt to compromise and 
settle a controversy without the trouble and ex-
pense of the institution of suit and the trial of the 
cause is a more important step in connection with 
the cause than argu1nent of a demurrer or the 
taking of a deposition for the preservation of 
testimony, and the general rule as to immunity 
should be extended to cases wherein, as here, 
a party to a controversy has been induced for this 
purpose to come within rifle range, as it were, 
under a flag of truce; if the purposes of the par-
ley is not accomplished, honor and fair dealing 
should dictate that such person be permitted u, 
reasonable time within which to return to the 
safety of the position from which he was induced 
to withdraw, before his adversary goes into ac-
tion." (Italics added.) 
This decision was annotated in 93 A.L.R. at page 
872, .and several cases are there discussed which are simi-
lar to the instant case, but in all of those cases the courts 
appear to have concluded that fraud must be shown in 
order to warrant the setting. aside of the service of sum-
mons and then to have concluded that inviting a non-
' resident into the state for the purpose of discussing settle-
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ment of a controversy and then serving him with sum-
mons in a suit involving the controversy which was con-
cerned in the invitation to come into the state, was, in 
and of itself, sufficient fraud to warrant setting aside 
the service of summons. As this defendant reads the 
decision in the Ellan case, the Montana Supreme Court 
is singular and outstanding in that it holds that a sum-
mons served under the.se circumstances should be quashed 
whether or not fraud is found to exist. 
It should be noted that the case at bar in this state 
involves the exact question which was involved in the 
Ellan case. A nonresident was invited into a foreign 
state to discuss settlement of a pending controversy. 
While in the foreign state for the sole purpose of the 
discussion of settlement, the nonresident was served with 
summons. He challenged the service of summons on the 
ground that it was obtained by trick and artifice and the 
trial court found that there was no trick or artifice. The 
question is, then, whether the state of Utah will extend 
the doctrine of immunity from service of summons to the 
case at bar. This could be done on the same ground 
adopted by all of the other courts except the ~fontana 
court, that is, a finding that the facts shown are suffi-
cient to make out the requisite fraud for setting aside the 
service of summons or, in the .alternative, upon the 
ground that public policy requires that a nonresident, 
invited into the state for purposes of discussing the 
settlement of an existing controversy, be inn11une fron1 
service of .sunnnons 'vhile coining into the state, during 
the negotiations, and for a sufficient time thereafter 
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to enable him to return to the state of his residence·. The 
appellant urges that this court abandon the circuitous 
route, refuse to give lip service to the fiction of actual 
fraud and state that the circumstances of this case re-
quire the summons to be quashed on the ground of im-
muni~ty from service of process. 
Subsequent to the decision of the Ell:an case, supra, 
a number of jurisdictions have referred to it, but in no 
instance has the case at bar been on .all fours with the 
Montana case, and in no case has it been overruled or 
rejected. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Iowa in Moseley 
v. Ricks, 274 N.W. 23, goes carefully into the rationale 
behind the principle of law extending immunity from 
service of process to persons who are within the state as 
parties or witnesses in judicial proceedings. In a sub-
stantial majority of the jurisdictions immunity has been 
extended to proceedings which are not strictly judicial 
proceedings. This extension is discussed at 35 A.L.R. 
1353, wherein Urtah is cited as a state which follows the 
rule extending the immunity from service to include per-
sons who are within the state as parties or witnesses in a 
proceeding which is not strictly judicial. See Cooke v. 
Cooke, 67 Utah 371, 248 P. 83, decided in 1926. The said 
Cooke case involves a very long opinion and the only 
point of interest to us here is Point 18 of the syllabus. 
This case is cited to show that Utah follow.s the more 
libe:val rule in this regard and it is not contended that the 
Cooke case is determinative of the issues before the 
court in the instant matter. 
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After the detennination of Moseley v. Ricks, supra, 
the Supreme Court of Iowa was again called upon to dis-
cuss the holding of the Ellan case. In Lingo v. Reichen-
bach Land Company et al., 27 N.W. 121, counsel for the 
defendant claimed to come within the protection of the 
doctrine advanced in the Ellan case. The Iowa court 
held that the facts were dissimilar and the summons 
should not be quashed. In discussing the Ellan case, 
however, .iJheJ Iowa court indicated that the Supreme 
Court of Montana had really held that bad faith or fraud 
was required and had found that it existed in. the case 
before it. Appellant cannot agree with this interpreta-
tion. 
In Lingo v. Reichenbach Land Company et al., 
supra, the nonresident defendant, Reichenbach, was the 
plaintiff in a case then pending in another county in 
Iowa. His eounsel in that case got in touch with the 
counsel for the defendant and requested a meeting-_be-
t,veen Reichenbach, himself and them. The stated pur-
pose of this conference \vas to be a discussion of settle-
ment in the other matter. There 'vas no discussion of 
the Lingo controversy. The n1eeting \vas held in Iowa 
and the case then pending in the other county was dis-
cussed, but no agree1nent 'vas reached. ·\'Vl1en he left the 
office where the conference \vas held, Reichenbach \vas 
served with a su1nn1ons in the Lingo suit. The attorneys 
for Lingo 'vere the srune .attorneys \vith whom the confer-
ence had just been held. The Supre1ne Court of Iowa 
carefully and clearly pointed out first, that the n1eeting 
to discuHs settlen1ent \vas brought about and arranged by 
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Reichenbach's attorney, not Lingo's, and the situation was 
not one where a resident plaintiff had invited a non-
resident· defendant to come into the state to discuss 
settlement, and second, that the action in which the suit 
was brought involved a wholly different matter from 
that in regard to which the conference was held. These 
facts distinguish the Lingo case from the Ellan case. 
As appellant reads the Lingo case. he gets the impression 
that the Supreme Court of Iow~a would quash service of 
summons in a case such as the Ellan case, and in the case 
at bar, but would do so upon the grounds that the facts 
shown are sufficient to constitute enough bad faith to 
vitiate the service. 
Appellant finds no case involving an invitation by a 
resident to a nonresident to come in the s~tate for the 
purpose ·of attempting to settle an existing controversy, 
the failure of the settlement discussion, and the service 
of summons in a suit on the same controversy, in which 
the court conclude·d that the summons was properly 
served and should not be quashed. 
Although the trial court app:arently found against it, 
there is te·stimony of plaintiff's officers and agents in 
the record from which it could have been found that the 
invitation to defendant and the subsequent .service of 
summons were not wholly in good faith. W. S. Wagstaff, 
President of the plaintiff corporation, stated (R. 44) that 
he had contemplated the possibility of legal action against 
l\1r. Berry around the first of the year, 1956. Mr. Olson, 
(R. 49) the General Sales Manager for the plaintiff, in a 
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portion of his deposition which was introduced because 
of a conflict between it and his testimony at the hearing, 
gave the following testimony indicating that the possi-
bility of suing Mr. Berry had been discussed prior to 
the invitation to come to Utah, and that there had been 
some discussion ·of Mr. Berry's nonresident status, as 
follows (R. 49 and 50): 
"Mr. Tanner: (Reading) 
Q. During this period of time, during the first 
five months, that would be up until June 1st, 
1956, did you oontemplate the possibility of 
suing Mr. Berry over the points of difference 
between the Company and Mr. Berry? 
A. Yes, I think so. 
Q. Did you discu,ss that with anyone Y 
A. Yes, I discussed it with Mr. 'Vagstaff. 
Q. Did you discuss it with Mr. Boren Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. When would that discussion have taken place 
to the best of your recollection Y 
A. I couldn't give you a d~ate on that. I don't 
know. 
Q. It would have been prior to June 1st, wouldn't 
it' 
A. Yes. 
Q. And had you personally concluded that it may 
be necessary to sue him Y 
A. I think that I felt there 'vas a good possibility 
that we would have to sue hin1. 
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Q. So that subject had been in your mind prior to 
June 1st~ 
A. The possibility of it, yes. 
Q. Have you ever discussed with Mr. Boren or 
Mr. W agst:aff whether such a suit could be 
brought in the state of Utah or not~ 
A. I don't quite unde.rstand your question. 
Q. What I am driving at is this: Mr. Berry lives 
in Idaho and the Company is here in Utah. 
Have you ever discussed with either Mr. 
Wagstaff or Mr. Boren whether suit, if 
brought, would have to he brought in one 
plaee or the other~ 
A. I think there was some limited amount of 
discussion on that point. 
Q. Do you remember the nature of it~ 
A. It would he very vague." 
Mr. Boren, again in a portion of a deposition intro-
duced because of a conflict between it and the testimony 
. . 
at the hearing, testified as follows (R. 60) : 
"Q. Did you eve·r advise Mr. Berry prior to the 
time he was served with summons in this 
action that he could expect suit to be brought 
against him~ 
A. No, I don't think so. I might qualify that by 
saying we never came right out and told him 
we would sue him." 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully requests this court to reverse 
the ruling of the trial court and hold that the motion to 
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quash should be granted under the facts and circum-
stances of this case for the reason that the defendant 
vvas inrmune from service of process in this case while in 
Utah in response to the invitation of the plaintiff to 
come to Utah and discuss settling the controversy which 
is the subject of this suit. In this regard it should be 
again pointed out that the sole purpose of the defendant 
in coming into the state of Utah was to confer with the 
officers of the plaintiff in regard to the settlement of this 
controversy, that, upon entering the state he drove di-
rectly to plaintiff's place of business and that, upon 
leaving, he went directly from plaintiff's place of busi-
ness back to Rexburg, Idaho. 
Appellant further contends that, in the event this 
court feels that had faith is .an essential prerequisite to 
the quashing of service of summons, it should hold that 
serving summons on a nonresident who has come into 
the state at the request of the plaintiff for the sole pur-
pose of discussing settlement of the controversy sued 
on is sufficient evidence of bad faith to invalidate the 
serVIce. 
Respectfully submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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